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Summary
In August 16, 2004, President Bush announced a program of sweeping changes
to the numbers and locations of  military basing facilities at overseas locations, now
known as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) or Global
Posture Review, a component of ongoing force transformation efforts.  Roughly
70,000 personnel would return from overseas locations from Europe and Asia to
bases in the continental United States (CONUS).  Other overseas forces would be
redistributed within current host nations such as Germany and South Korea, and new
bases would be established in nations of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa.
In the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) view, these locations would be closer, and
better able, to respond to potential trouble spots.   
In August 2005, the congressionally mandated Commission on the Review of
Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (also known as the
“Overseas Basing Commission”) formally reported its findings.  It disagreed with the
“timing and synchronization” of the DOD overseas re-basing initiative, and
questioned whether a strategic vision agreed upon by all effected government
agencies was guiding the re-basing.  It also saw the initiative as potentially at odds
with stresses on the force that the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan caused. The
Commission questioned whether sufficient interagency coordination, such as State
Department led basing rights negotiations, have occurred.  It expressed doubts that
the military had enough airlift and sealift to make the strategy work, and noted that
DOD had likely underestimated the cost of all aspects associated with the moves
(DOD budgeted $4 billion, the Commission estimated $20 billion).  The Commission
also expressed fear that the re-basing could harm military quality of life, which would
in turn hamper recruiting and retention.  DOD disagreed with much of the
Commission’s analysis.  Meanwhile, advocacy groups have voiced concern about the
DOD plan, arguing that it would harm long-standing alliance relationships.  Other
groups stated doubts about DOD planning to accommodate the thousands of troops
who would be returning to the U.S. from overseas bases.
The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission delivered its report
recommending U.S. base closures to the President. The President has forwarded their
recommendations unchanged to Congress.  The  Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR), a study that Congress mandates DOD to accomplish every four years to
allocate missions and guide military procurement, is planned to complete in early
2006.  Critics argue that the BRAC plan and the QDR should have been finalized
before completing the overseas basing plan.
Recent international diplomatic and security developments could further
influence debate on overseas basing.  Host nations such as South Korea have begun
to voice limits on the use of forces based in their country.  Uzbekistan, one of the test
cases for the new strategy, recently evicted U.S. forces from the base in that Central
Asian nation.  Some analysts argue this eviction was prompted from Russia and
China, who have begun to express concern with U.S. expansion of influence in the
region.  This report will be updated as necessary.
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1 FY2004 Military Construction Appropriations Act (H.R. 2559/P.L. 108-132 of November
22, 2003), sec. 128. This Commission was chartered to make a “thorough study of matters
relating to the military facility structure of the United States overseas.”  This study would
also consider issues pertaining to overseas military construction and facilities, host nation
support payments, training ranges, and opportunities to close or realign overseas bases.  It
was specifically chartered to provide “a proposal ... for an overseas basing strategy for the
Department of Defense,” see House of Representatives, Conference Report on H.R. 2559
(H.Rept. 108-342), Making Appropriations for Military Construction, Family Housing, and
Base Realignment and Closure for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending
September 30, 2004, and for Other Purposes, November 4, 2003; for historical perspective
on the debates that drove the chartering of the Overseas Basing Commission, see CRS
Report RL32310, “Appropriations for FY2005: Military Construction,” by Daniel H. Else,
November 15, 2005.
U.S. Military Overseas Basing: New
Developments and Oversight Issues for
Congress
Introduction and Issues for Congress
On August 16, 2004, President Bush unveiled one of the most sweeping changes
to the numbers and locations of military overseas basing facilities since the beginning
of the Cold War.  Announcing a plan that had been under study for approximately
three years, the Department of Defense would move thousands of personnel from
installations in Europe and Asia to bases within the United States.  Simultaneously,
the military would shift its approach away from huge bases such as Ramstein, which
has all of the comforts of the U.S. — family housing, supermarkets, convenience
stores, theaters, and so forth, to reliance on more austere facilities in Central Asia,
Africa, and the Middle East that would be less elaborate and lack most of these
benefits.  In 2004, the Congress chartered the Commission on the Review of
Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (also known as the Overseas
Basing Commission) to provide an independent assessment of the DOD overseas
basing needs.1  
The DOD plan could prompt budget and oversight decisions for Congress.
These might include approval, modification, or rejection of the DOD proposal.
Congress could also have to consider appropriations requests for construction of
infrastructure at new overseas or expanded continental United States (CONUS)
locations, as well as fund increased impact aid to local communities.  Congress
would have to oversee new acquisition programs for mobility and logistics
capabilities (such as airlift) needed for the strategy.  Congress would need to ensure
the plan will be executable given the results of the current round of the Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. Finally, Congress would have to consider
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2 During the Cold War, U.S. troops were positioned to stop an invasion by tanks and aircraft
of the U.S.S.R. and Warsaw pact from Eastern Europe into Western Germany.  This
required an extensive infrastructure of bases, runways, and training areas to support large
numbers of conventional forces.  The U.S. also maintained large forces in Japan and South
Korea, both to deter the Soviets in Asia and to support security guarantees to the South
Koreans, where to date a formal peace treaty ending the 1951-53 war with North Korea does
not exist. 
3 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the Congress and the
President, (Department of Defense, 2004), 60.
4 Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. to Cut Number of Overseas Bases,” Los Angeles Times, September
24, 2005; “U.S. to Close 35 Percent of Overseas Bases,” New York Times on the Web,
September 23, 2004; Congressional Budget Office, Options for Changing the Army’s
Overseas Basing, May 2004.
5 For comparison, Ramstein AB in Germany has 14,300 military permanent party personnel
as of May 2005, see “Guide to Air Force Installations Worldwide,” Air Force Magazine 88,
no. 5, (May 2005): pg. 136.
ratification of new or revised treaties, such as status of forces agreements, to support
the United States relationship with new basing partners.  
Background
The Department of Defense Strategy 
The Department of Defense Global Posture Review, also known as the
Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS), is intended to reduce
United States overseas forces over a six-to-eight-year period from the numbers and
locations of overseas bases (basing “posture”) left over from the Cold War2 to new
locations optimized to support current allies and confront new potential threats.3
Overall, U.S. installations overseas would decline from 850 to 550.  Roughly 70,000
personnel, mostly from the Army, would return to the U.S.  The Congressional
Budget Office projects the potential cost of this relocation effort at $7 billion, but
with a potential savings payoff of $1 billion per year if the number of U.S. troops
overseas was reduced to a minimum number needed to receive and host
deployments.4 
The Defense Department plan envisions three tiers of bases.  It would retain
some of the large “main operating bases,”such as Ramstein AFB in Germany, which
have all of the comforts of the U.S. — family housing, schools, supermarkets,
convenience stores, theaters, and populations in the tens of thousands.5  Further, the
military would establish an overseas network of “forward operating sites,” which are
more austere installations, lacking the conveniences and hosting smaller numbers of
personnel.  Military personnel would deploy to these bases for temporary duty
(typically one year or less, unaccompanied by families), in contrast to the permanent
change of station moves in which an entire family moves to a new base for two or
more years.  Lastly, minimalist “cooperative security locations,” would likely be run
by host nation personnel and would not host U.S. forces on a day-to-day basis.  These
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6  “U.S. to Close 35 Percent of Overseas Bases,” New York Times on the Web, September
23, 2004.
7 Maritime prepositioning uses a fleet of cargo ships preloaded with supplies and equipment
located near potential trouble spots.  Prepositioning this material reduces the time required
for a military unit and its equipment to deploy to a combat area.  The best known example
is stationed near the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.  See CRS Report RL32513,
“Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ship Programs, Background
and Oversight Issues for Congress,” by Ronald O’Rourke, August 2, 2005 for more
information.
8 Department of Defense, “Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths By Regional Area and
By Country,” June 30 2005,  [http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/military/history/hst0605.pdf]
9 Vince Crawley, “Pentagon Gives Congress Plan for Overseas Basing,” Air Force Times,
October 11, 2004, p. 12; Vince Crawley, “European Chief Considers Using Existing,
Austere Bases,” Army Times, January 17, 2005, p. 23; Ann Scott Tyson, “New U.S.
Strategy: ‘Lily Pad’ Bases,” Christian Science Monitor, August 10 2004; Vince Crawley,
“Closer to New Allies, Potential Trouble Spots,” Marine Corps Times, June 6, 2005, p. 15;
Vince Crawley, “Discussions Push for Bases in Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia,” Army Times,
May 16, 2005, p. 10. 
10 Department of Defense, “Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths By Regional Area and
By Country,” June 30 2005,  [http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/military/history/hst0605.pdf];
also note that the Korea moves began in 2004 and will continue through 2008, so over 5,000
of the 12,500 have already been moved.
locations would be used in the event of a crisis to give U.S. forces access to the
region.  They would also allow U.S. forces to train with local allies and participate
in cooperative activities, such as disaster relief or peacekeeping, which can improve
military-to-military ties.6   U.S. forces would also rely heavily on off-shore pre-
positioning and sea basing to provide logistical support.7
The biggest changes would happen in Europe, where the military would shutter
nearly 200 facilities and draw down roughly 40,000 troops from 105,570 as of June
2005.8  Some of the forces remaining in Europe would periodically deploy from
bases in Germany for temporary duty to locations in Romania, Bulgaria, or Central
Asia.  Both Romania and Bulgaria are energetically campaigning to win U.S. bases,
however, specific negotiations to secure rights to base in some of these new locations
are not complete.  Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, Eagle Base in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and Manas Air Field in Kyrgestan typify the new approach.  While representing a full
time U.S. presence, these bases would lack the elaborate infrastructure of the major
installations that evolved in western Europe.  The buildings consist of Quonset huts
or pole buildings, and in some cases are still tent cities.  The troops are not
accompanied by their families.  Overall, the focus of military efforts would shift
south and east, closer to current Middle-Eastern hot-spots.9  
For Asia, the plan advocates consolidating bases in South Korea, with a
drawdown of nearly 12,500 personnel (from a strength of 32,744 troops in June
2005),10 and move headquarters for remaining units out of expensive Seoul real estate
to locations further south.  Adjustments are also envisioned for troop dispositions in
Japan, with an interim agreement proposing to move 7,000 of the 15,000 Marines
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11 Yoshio Okubo, “Moving U.S. Bases Splits Nation,” Daily Yomiuri, December 2, 2004;
“Impatient U.S. Seeks June Talks on Bases,” Financial Times, March 12, 2005; Kuniichi
Tanida, “Locals Up in Arms Over Deal That Leaves Combat Units Untouched,” The Asahi
Shimbun, October 31, 2005.  Reports indicate the U.S. proposing to move the 1st Army
headquarters to Camp Zama, near Tokyo, from Washington state in the U.S., to reposition
the 5th Air Force headquarters from Tokyo to Guam, and to relocate some Marines from
Okinawa to Guam.
12 Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, “New Battle Stations?” Foreign Affairs 82,
no. 2 (September/October 2003): 95-103; Robert L. Maginnis, “Calling Troops Home,”
Washington Times, August 14, 2005, p. B05; Andrew Krepinevich, “The New Pax
Americana: Restructure Base Strategy, Defense Program,” Defense News, September 20
2004, p. 28; John T. Bennett, “DOD in Talks with South, West African Nations About
Basing Rights,” Inside the Pentagon, October 21 2004; Andrew Koch, “U.S. Basing Plans
in Africa Gain Clarity,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 1, 2005.  
13 CRS Report RL32758, “U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism:
Afghanistan, Africa, the Phillippines, and Columbia,” by Andrew Feickert, August 26, 2005,
includes detailed discussion of some of the recent U.S. military initiatives in Africa.
14 Department of Defense, “Global Posture,” Testimony as Prepared for Delivery by
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Services Committee, September
23, 2004, [http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040923-secdef0783.html].
currently on Okinawa to Guam.11  Other U.S. forces in Asia could potentially deploy
to the Philippines, Malaysia, or Singapore for exercises, training, and as-needed
forward basing.  Reliance on air and naval capability would increase in the Pacific
given the vast distances in the region.  The U.S. presence in Africa would likely
expand.12  The U.S. already has established Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs)
with Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda, where the focus
would be on training and cooperation.13
Re-Basing Rationale
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld listed multiple reasons for reworking the overseas military
basing dispositions.  He argued that the current arrangements were “seriously
obsolete,” oriented to deter and fight the large standing militaries of the Cold War
rather than the current threats.  However, he gave no geographic specifics on where
he viewed the new threats as residing.  He stated that updating the military’s global
posture was part of the Department’s larger transformation effort, but his comments
did not clarify how the transformational goals such as speed or precision (in his
words, to “do more with less”) drove the overseas basing strategy decisions.  He
claimed that relocating personnel and facilities in some cases could reduce frictions
with host governments and enhance cooperation with allies.  Yet, he also indicated
that nations that imposed restrictions or conditions on the use of U.S. forces from
their territory would be viewed as less satisfactory locations.14
During his June 2005 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Military
Construction Subcommittee, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Ryan Henry echoed many of Secretary Rumsfeld’s themes.  He noted an increased
reliance on pre-positioned equipment and forces that move to forward operating sites
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15  U.S. Congress, Senate,  Appropriations Committee, Military Construction and Veterans’
Affairs Subcommittee, “Statement by Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense,” June 28, 2005.
16 “Statement by Ryan Henry,” June 28, 2005.
17 “New Report on Overseas Basing Plans Remains Critical of Pace, Timing,” Inside the
Pentagon, August 18, 2005; U.S. Congress, Senate,  Appropriations Committee, Military
Construction and Veterans’ Affairs Subcommittee, “Opening Statement of Al Cornella,
Chairman, Overseas Basing Commission,” June 28, 2005.
on a temporary basis, but did not explain the anticipated mix between these forces
and permanently stationed forces, or what the department would need for airlift and
sealift to sustain this approach.  He also suggested that the new strategy would
improve military families’ quality of life because they would experience fewer
disruptive overseas moves, and the military member would have a more predictable
deployment schedule.  However, the strategy’s reliance on more frequent short
deployments which would drive family separations would seem to some to contradict
this assertion.15
Deputy Undersecretary Henry also highlighted the linkage with this year’s
BRAC round and the current QDR study, scheduled to be released in February
2006.16 However, it would seem advantageous for the strategic vision to be
encapsulated in the first QDR performed after 9/11 and, arguably, should precede a
realignment of global basing structure, rather than trail it by over a year.  Likewise,
since many of the overseas personnel are projected to return to the U.S., knowledge
of the bases that would be available stateside after the Congress approves the BRAC
Commission findings would be a logical precursor to bringing troops back from
foreign installations.  It is unclear what factors are driving the decision making
process, but it is logical that basing arrangements optimized for Cold War adversaries
may not be suitable to counter current threats.
The Overseas Basing Commission
Commission Report Findings
On August 15, 2005, the congressionally chartered Overseas Basing
Commission released its final report.  The Commission visited with senior military
leaders, defense analysts, and senior officials from other government agencies, and
traveled extensively to bases on site visits. In general, the report was critical of the
DOD’s overseas restructuring process and proposal.17 
There were, however, several areas in which the Commission’s report concurred
with DOD.  It lauded the ongoing concept of transforming of the military from a Cold
War structure to meet new requirements. It agreed that the shifting of forces in South
Korea and the return of most Army heavy forces from Central Europe was
appropriate.  It also supported the concepts of forward operating sites and cooperative
security locations.  The Commission agreed that these arrangements would give more
options in a crisis and more opportunities to work with newallies, thus expanding
CRS-6
18 Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing Structure of the United
States, “Report to the President and the Congress,” August 15, 2005, p. I-xii,
[http://obc.gov/documents].
19 Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing, pp. ix, 4-11.
20 Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing, pp. ix-x, 11-16.
21 Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing, pp. x,16-20.  The
Congressional Budget Office recently completed a study comparing strategic mobility
alternatives, including an examination of new types of systems like heavy lift airships
(blimps).  See Congressional Budget Office, Options for Strategic Military Transportation
Systems, September 2005.
positive U.S. influence.  However, the report’s major finding held that “the timing
and synchronization of the global re-basing initiatives must be rethought.”18  
Chairman Cornella argued that DOD’s plan overemphasized a purely military
perspective, and neglected to more fully reflect the concerns of all members of the
national security interagency community.  For example, State Department concerns
about opportunities to enhance alliance relationships through exercises and
exchanges and to exert political and diplomatic influence in the regions under review
were allegedly given inadequate attention.  The Commission believed the desire to
implement base withdrawals quickly, rather than specific strategic decisions and
coordination, seemed to be driving the selections.  Further, the report held that the
locations were picked based on today’s threats rather than a long term view of the
anticipated threat.  It expressed concern that the plan disregards the politics and
values of some of the new potential allies, which might not dovetail with U.S.
interests.19
The report questioned the timing of the moves in a environment of fast-paced
current military operations.  The Commission expressed concern that the strain of
conducting this sweeping series of moves, while also conducting major conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan has the potential to threaten the capability of the force.  Forces
would either be preparing to deploy, deployed, or returning from deployment, while
also trying to reestablish their unit’s support structure, military personnel, and
families at new bases.  Further, it viewed the pace of the aggressive time line
proposed by DOD, projected as 2006 through 2011, as being overly ambitious.20
The Commission noted that mobility and material prepositioning were key to
the success of the re-basing strategy.  However, it expressed concern that current and
projected strategic airlift and strategic sealift were inadequate for the Defense
Department’s concept, which  relies heavily on transporting troops to crisis areas
rather than forward basing.  It also held that sufficient prepositioned supply stocks
do not now exist.  Most importantly, it argued that future budget plans for projected
mobility requirements did not account for the re-basing plan’s needs.21
The report strongly highlighted claims that the re-basing plan would harm the
quality of life of volunteer military personnel.  It noted that the military has
insufficient plans to ensure both that required support facilities at U.S. bases gaining
personnel are in place for new personnel by the first day they arrive, and that facilities
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22 Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing, pp. x-xi, 20-25. 
23 Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing, pp. xi, 25-29. 
24 Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing, pp. xi-xii, 29-32. 
25 The Mobility Capabilities Study is a Department of Defense project to analyze how much
airlift and sealift will be required for the future.  It relies on computer modeling of multiple
deployment scenarios to determine how much capacity will be needed.  In turn, that data
will be used to guide procurement programs for new airlift aircraft, air refueling aircraft, fast
(continued...)
are preserved at the losing base overseas until the last person is gone. These support
facilities include commissaries, exchanges,  hospitals, and child care capacity on base
and off base support capability provided by the local and state communities such as
schools and housing.  Without this support, young military families with limited
incomes may suffer in areas of spouse employment, family health, and cost of living.
The Commission also argues that the heightened tempo of temporary overseas
rotations that is central to the plan will result in frequent family separations over the
course of a career that could threaten retention and recruiting.  The decision to stay
in the service is very much a family decision, and when many child growth
milestones are missed, or a spouse experiences enough home emergencies and worry
while the military member is deployed away overseas, the balance can tip to
separation from the military.22
Significantly, the report contended that the DOD might have underestimated the
total cost to implement their base realignment process.  The Commission’s
independent analysis calculated a $20 billion bill for the moves, while the DOD has
only budgeted $4 billion through 2011.  The danger is that the services will need to
spend from their operations and maintenance budget accounts (which should
normally be used to buy day-to-day material such as expendable equipment, fuel, or
ammunition) to cover the difference.  This could result in potential damage to force
readiness, given the budget demands caused by combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.23
The Commission, given what it viewed as inadequate interagency, budgetary,
strategic mobility, and quality of life planning, recommended a slowing and
reordering of the pace of activity associated with overseas re-basing. It noted that the
acquisition of key capabilities, such as mobility and prepositioned supplies,  required
to support the new strategy had not occurred.  It also claimed that the budget support
for establishing forces at new locations (mainly back in the U.S.), such as funding for
the movement of people and equipment and any new building at these locations was
lacking.  Further, preparatory activities needed for local communities to absorb
thousands of new military families, such as support for additional schools and roads,
were absent.24
In general, the Commission held that a coherent national strategy did not
sufficiently guide the overseas posture review and that a formal national debate on
the larger scope of American security post-Cold War should precede the re-basing
moves.  It argued that completion of the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Base
Realignment and Closure Commission report, and the Mobility Capabilities Study25
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25 (...continued)
sealift ships, and maritime prepositioning assets.  See CRS Report RL32887, “Strategic
Mobility Innovation: Options and Oversight Issues,” by Jon D. Klaus, April 29, 2005 for an
Overview of the Mobility Capabilities Study and options under consideration.  
26 Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Basing, pp. xii-xiii. 
27 U.S. Department of Defense, “Defense Department Special Briefing,” May 9, 2005,
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050509-2701.html].
were key to providing an overall architecture for a updating of our overseas posture.
The Commission strongly recommended diligent Congressional  oversight of this
process to ensure a cohesive basing strategy.26
Responses to the Commission Report
The Defense Department responded to the Commission’s report upon its release
in May 2005.  Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Policy Ryan Henry and Acting
Under Secretary of the Army Ray Dubois met with the press and delivered specific
counterpoints to many of the report’s findings.  Mr. Henry rebutted the
Commission’s critique of the DOD choices for strategic dispositions.  Where the
Commission viewed the DOD selections as based on today’s threats, he asserted that
the concept strove to base the forces in locations that supported flexibility and speed
of response to anywhere in an unpredictable environment.27  Critics contend,
however, to simply assert that future threats are unpredictable sidesteps the challenge
of articulating a strategic vision, which includes a projection of anticipated threats.
Mr. Henry also took issue with the Commission’s argument that DOD had not
sufficiently coordinated the Global Posture Review across government agencies.  He
cited meetings with the regional combatant commanders that began shortly after the
2001 QDR, as well as consultation with the Department of State, the National
Security Council, and 45 briefings to capitol hill staffers and members of Congress.
His view was that Congress had indicated satisfaction with the amount of oversight
consultation to this point.  He also highlighted visits to the government leadership in
over 20 foreign countries that could be affected by the moves.  While he noted the
number of meetings, he did not indicate whether the briefings were in- depth or
ongoing, nor the state of progress, particularly regarding the delicate status of forces
agreements that guide basing rules with the foreign countries.  He stated that the
Global Posture Review was intended to serve as a starting point to feed the 2005
QDR, as well as the 2005 BRAC and the Mobility Capability Study, all of which
were to be coordinated in parallel. Therefore, it would fall to the QDR to address the
timing of lift procurement and other needed acquisition to ensure it supports the
Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS).  However, since the QDR
is intended to be the keystone document outlining DODs future strategic vision,
selecting how the military will align its bases before determining the strategy they are
trying to achieve raises questions of appropriate sequence.
Mr. Dubois disputed the Commission report’s concerns that DOD was short-
changing military families’ quality of life.  He noted that the department held
discussions with the Department of Education, as well as state governors and leaders
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of communities that would be vital partners in supporting returning personnel and
dependents.  He did not, however, indicate if additional impact aid for these
communities was planned for future budget requests.  He also pointed out that the re-
basing plan’s decisions were incorporated into the BRAC analysis.  However, given
that the BRAC results have not been approved by Congress, it is left unclear which
communities would have to prepare to host additional troops, and what the status of
preparation was, even though moves from overseas were ready to start.  He held that
the re-basing would give other payoffs to improve quality of life; particularly that the
number of family permanent changes of station (PCSs) would be fewer, thus
reducing the turmoil of overseas moves.  Although reducing the number of PCS
moves may offer greater stability, it assumes that all military bases are of equal
desirability in their geographical location and facilities, which is often not the case.
DOD also appears to assume the overseas stationing in permanent European bases
(such as Germany,  Italy) are undesirable to military families, which is also often not
the case.  In fact, the opportunity to periodically live overseas is, for some, an
advantage of a military career.  Mr. Dubois also did not address, however, the stress
that increased unaccompanied overseas deployments would place on families, or the
troops deployed at isolated, “bare-bones” locations.  Neither official addressed the
potential  impact on recruiting or retention.
Finally, Mr. Henry downplayed the disparity between the Defense Department’s
and the Commission’s cost figures.  He suggested that the Commission’s study
included costs that other programs in the defense budget covered, while DOD figures
only focused on the additional costs driven specifically by the moves.  Mr. Dubois
also noted that the military would eventually accrue savings in operations and
maintenance accounts as they drew down from maintaining expensive overseas
locations.  Yet even if these costs will be covered by other programs in the budget,
there is no indication that the department has proposed an increase for those budget
items, such as construction, airlift procurement, or sealift procurement, which are
critical to make the new strategy work. Further, it is unclear that the compensation
the U.S. would get from the new host nations would offset that currently received
from established allies. Commonly, countries in which U.S. bases are located provide
various forms of “host nation support.”  This could include services, construction,
and even cash payments in recognition of the benefit to local economies.  However,
many of the new locations, such as Kyrgyzstan, are demanding payments from the
U.S. to allow basing in their countries. 
  Reaction to the Pentagon’s plan continued to emerge from beyond the
Commission.  Alliance relationships formed one topic for debate.  Historically,
European allies have been especially desirous of keeping a significant U.S. presence,
which they view as supporting European stability and integration.  Security
guarantees to other allies have encouraged their support of non-proliferation regimes.
Some critics, such as Philip H. Gordon at the Brookings Institution, fear that moving
forces away from long term allies to basing in nations less likely to restrain U.S.
military operations would give the Administration more latitude to take unilateral
military action in future crises without consultation, thus further harming
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relationships and the U.S. image.28  Others have reinforced the concern that the
moves could erode ties with traditional, long term American allies, with particular
focus centered on the relationship with Germany.  Some, such as Pat Towell at the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, even suggested that the moves were
intended as punishment of Germany by the Bush administration for its opposition to
U.S. operations in Iraq.29  At the same time, it bears recognition that land restrictions
and real estate costs for some U.S. allies has led to limitations on training and
exercises.  Further, prudent U.S. relocations could reduce frictions with local
populations, especially in Okinawa and South Korea. 
Advocacy groups for military personnel and families echoed the report’s
warnings regarding the impact of the re-basing strategy on quality of life.  Some, like
Joyce Raezer of the National Military Family Association, suggested that DOD’s
record of preparation for past unit moves showed that services were not ready for
families at new locations, and that services closed before old locations were empty.
Likewise, they fear the strain on civilian infrastructure, such as roads, schools, and
housing, could cause problems with the relocations.  For example, as a new brigade
recently assumed post at Fort Drum (Watertown NY), soldiers had to look up to 75
miles away for housing.30  Such long commutes will strain soldiers on shift work or
delay their response in a crisis.  Scarce housing also could harm personnels’ standard
of living, particularly for families where both adults are active duty members, or
single parent households.  It could also drive up rent costs for junior enlisted
members.  It could also limit civilian spouse employment opportunities.  Schools in
Watertown also became overcrowded, and the single hospital in town lacked capacity
for the new patients (Ft Drum has no base hospital).  However, other larger
communities, such as El Paso TX,  have expressed enthusiasm for the job growth and
homebuilding surge these moves would prompt.31  The operational deployment
tempo associated with combat in Iraq and Afghanistan already adversely pressures
recruiting and retention.32  The strains of re-basing and more frequent deployments
and separations under the new strategy could emerge as another element which tips
troops’ decisions against joining or staying in the service.
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Recent Developments
Department of Defense
Other Department of Defense transformational programs that interact with the
IGPBS continue to progress.  On May 12, 2005, the Department of Defense released
its submission to the BRAC Commission for bases to close or realign.  During 24-27
August 2005, the BRAC Commission conducted their deliberations and finalized
their determinations for the submission to the President, on September 8, 2005.  The
BRAC Commission reviewed Pentagon proposals to close or realign over 800
installations.  Most of the DOD plan remained unchanged, with the Commission
adopting 86% of the DOD’s proposal. On September 15, 2005, the President
forwarded the BRAC Commission recommendations to Congress for approval.
Congress has not yet taken action on the BRAC plan, which will automatically
become law after 45 days, unless Congress specifically acts to disapprove the plan.33
 
Regarding the key supporting documents for the IGPBS, the 2005 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) will continue through February 2006, while the Mobility
Capabilities Study was completed at the end of July 2005, and is being briefed to
senior leaders to gain final approval.  To spur movement on the contentious QDR
study, acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England recently directed
Pentagon leadership to focus their analysis on three core missions: homeland defense,
global war on terrorism, and conventional major warfare in order to streamline
deliberations from more than 160 issues originally nominated for consideration.
Solving the question of “enabler” forces, which include logistics and mobility
functions, remains a point of contention and is a critical aspect of QDR linkage with
the Global Posture Review.  With regard to force structure, reports indicate that in
order to free funds for a potential QDR call to increase Army and Marine forces for
the war on terror, the Navy might drop from 11 to 10 carrier battle groups.  Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld had proposed this idea as early as September 2004, but it would
also seem to cut into the power projection and mobility concepts pivotal to the global
re-basing strategy.34
CRS-12
35 “Roh Tells U.S. to Stay Out of Regional Affairs,” Washington Times, March 11, 2005, p.
16.
36 Robin Wright, Ann Scott Tyson, “ U.S. Evicted from Air Base in Uzbekistan,”
Washington Post, July 30, 2005, p. 1.
37 Christopher Brown, “Uzbekistan Signals,” Washington Times, August 14, 2005, p. B03.
38 Halinma Kazem, “Karzai Hints at Permanent U.S. Military Basing,” Los Angeles Times,
April 14, 2005; Jonathan S. Landay, “4 GIs Killed as Afghan Attacks Increase,” Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, August 22, 2005, p. A3.
International Arena
Recent international developments potentially cast shadows on key assumptions
underlying the Global Posture Review.  There might be indicators of an international
shift in the degree of welcome extended by other countries to basing U.S. forces.  For
example, a statement by South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun would seem to place
limits on the United States ability to employ forces stationed in Korea to missions
beyond the peninsula.35
Of particular concern to the re-basing plan are recent developments in
Uzbekistan.  On July 29, 2005, the United States was formally notified that it had 180
days to leave its air base at Karshi-Khanabad, in Uzbekistan.  This base has served
as a vital hub for missions flown to support operations in Afghanistan, and was
prototypical of the cooperative security locations envisioned in the Pentagon re-
basing plan.  One reason for this eviction might have been State Department pressure
on the Tashkent government regarding recent human rights abuses.36  Another reason
for the eviction might have been encouragement from China and Russia,  who have
indicated increasing unease regarding U.S. military activity in the Central Asia region
— a region seen by the United States as strategically vital to the war on terror.
Commentators contend that Russia, and particularly China, are exploiting the
perception of U.S. support for democratic revolutions in Georgia and the Ukraine as
examples of a U.S. threat to the power of the area’s authoritarian leaders, such as
President Karimov in Uzbekistan.  During the demonstrations that prompted the
harsh Uzbek government response and attendant U.S. criticism, China publicly
expressed support for Karimov’s actions.  Furthermore, shortly before the United
States’ eviction, Karimov visited Beijing, where he garnered $1.5 billion in contracts
and agreements between China and Uzbekistan.37
Finally, the political and security climate in some locations proposed for U.S.
forward bases could require a disproportionate amount of manpower be dedicated to
local security requirements.  For example, while President Hamid Karzai has signaled
a desire for a permanent U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, an upsurge of
violence killed seven U.S. troops in a four day period in August 2005.  This increase
of attacks also wounded two embassy staffers, four years after the defeat of the
Taliban.38  Other countries reported to be under consideration for, or already hosting
U.S. troops confront significant terrorist threats of their own.  For example, the
“Lord’s Resistance Army” continues to stage brutal attacks in Uganda, with a limited
cease-fire having failed at the beginning of the year.  In Turkmenistan, a country
under consideration to host the U.S. forces removed from Uzbekistan, government
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crackdowns on terrorists have led to accusations of major violations of human rights
and civil liberties curtailments.39
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress
The Overseas Basing Commission pointedly emphasized the importance of
Congressional oversight of the overseas basing realignment process.  Some of the
issues Congress may wish to consider include the following:
Strategy
Does the IGPBS have adequate linkage to an overarching strategic framework
agreed upon by all key government parties in the national security strategy process?
Has the necessary, supporting analysis, including the Quadrennial Defense Review,
the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, and the Mobility Capabilities Study,
properly accounted for the requirements of overseas basing realignment?  Is now the
right time to execute the proposed transformation, and is the proposed time line
feasible?
Cost
Are the Defense Department’s cost projections for the overseas realignment
accurate?  Will projected savings outweigh the cost of realignment and associate
systems procurement?  Has the Department properly programmed for logistics and
mobility assets to support the new strategy?  Have other affected federal, state, and
local government agencies adequately anticipated the services and infrastructure costs
driven by the bed down of returning forces and their families to the United States?
Operational Tempo
Is it feasible to conduct the basing realignment moves given the deployment
tempo driven by ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?  Can the
Services permanently sustain the long term pace of frequent deployments required
by the strategy?  What will be the impact of the realignment on military recruiting,
retention, and the quality of life in the military?
Diplomacy
What will be the effect of the re-basing on the relationship with long term U.S.
allies, such as Germany, where a draw down is proposed?  Have sufficient legal
arrangements, such as status of forces agreements and overflight rights, been
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negotiated in advance of the arrival of U.S. forces in new host nations?  What
guarantees does the U.S. have of freedom of military action from bases in the new
locations?  Do the political climates in the new host nations support U.S. values of
democracy and human rights?  Do the internal security environments in the proposed
locations pose a threat to U.S. military personnel stationed there?  Is the re-basing
proposal affected by standing treaties to which the U.S. is a state party, such as the
Conventional Forces in Europe treaty?40 
